Best 8 quotes of Alexandre Koyre on MyQuotes

The belief in creation as the background of empiricomathematical [sic] science - that seems strange. Yet the ways of thought, human thought, in its search for truth are, indeed, very strange.

What the founders of modern science ... had to do, was not criticize and to combat certain faulty theories, and to correct or to replace them by better ones. They had to do something quite different. They had to destroy one world and replace it by another. They had to reshape the framework of our intellect itself, to restate and to reform its concepts, to evolve a new approach to Being, a new concept of knowledge, and a new concept of science - and even to replace a pretty natural approach, that of common sense, by another which is not natural at all.

Il dialogo socratico, sia esso composto da Platone, Senofonte o Eschine di Sfetto, non mira a insegnarci una determinata dottrina - che Socrate, come tutti sanno e come infinite volte egli stesso ci ha detto non ha mai posseduto - ma intende evocare un'immagine luminosa del filosofo assassinato, intende difendere e perpetuare la sua memoria e quindi tramandarne il messaggio. Tale messaggio, essi ci dicono, è senza dubbio filosofico. Ma, se è vero che i dialoghi comportano un insegnamento, non si tratta dell'esposizione di una dottrina, bensì di una lezione di metodo. Socrate infatti ci insegna l'uso e il valore della definizione dei concetti che vengono impiegati nella discussione e nello stesso tempo ci dimostra come sia impossibile arrivare a possedere il concetto senza procedere preliminarmente ad una revisione critica delle nozioni tradizionali, delle opinioni <> presenti e operanti nel linguaggio. Il risultato apparentemente negativo della discussione è di grande valore. E' molto importante infatti sapere di non sapere, scoprire che le opinioni e il linguaggio comuni, pur formando il punto di partenza della riflessione filosofica, non costituiscono altro che questo e che la discussione dialettica tende proprio al suo superamento.

In totalitarian anthropology man is not defined by thought, reason or judgment, because, according to it, the overwhelming majority of men lack just these very faculties. Besides, can one speak in terms of man altogether? Decidedly not. For totalitarian anthropology denies the existence of any human essence, single and common to all men. Between one man and "another man" the difference is not one of degree but of kind, says that anthropology. The old Greek definition of man, distinguishing him as the zoon logicon rests on an equivocation: there is no more necessary connection between reason and the word than there is between man, the reasoning animal, and man, the talking animal. For the talking animal is above all the credulous animal, and the credulous animal is by definition one who does not think. Thought, that is, reason, the ability to distinguish the true from the false, to make decisions and judgments—all this, according to totalitarian anthropology, is very rare. It is the concern of the elite, not of the mob. The mass of men are guided or, more accurately, acted upon, by instinct, passion, sentiments and resentment. The mass do not know how to think nor do they care to. They know only one thing: to obey and believe.

It is patent that any group [believing itself to be] surrounded by a world of unbending and irreconcilable foes would see the abyss between itself and them as one that could be spanned by no tie or social obligation. Within such a group, the lie—as told to the "others"—would be neither an act merely tolerated nor a simple rule of social behavior; it would become obligatory and be transformed into a virtue.

That man has always lied, to himself and to others, is indisputable. He has lied for the sheer fun of it—the fun of exercising this astounding gift of being able to "say what is not so," creating by his word a world for which he alone is responsible. Also, he has lied in self-defense: the lie is a weapon. It is the preferred weapon of the underdog and the weakling.

The mob believes everything it is told, provided only that it be repeated over and over. Provided too that its passions, hatreds, fears are catered to. Nor need one try to stay within the limits of plausibility: on the contrary, the grosser, the bigger, the cruder the lie, the more readily is it believed and followed. Nor is there any need to avoid contradictions: the mob never notices; needless to pretend to correlate what is said to some with what is said to others: each person or group believes only what he is told, not what anyone else is told; needless to strive for coherence: the mob has no memory; needless to pretend to any truth: the mob is radically incapable of perceiving it: the mob can never comprehend that its own interests are what is at stake.

The official philosophies of the totalitarian regimes unanimously brand as nonsensical the idea that there exists a single objective truth valid for everybody. The criterion of "truth," they say, is not agreement with reality, but agreement with the spirit of a race or nation or class—that is, racial, national or utilitarian. Pushing to their limits the biological, pragmatist, activist theories of truth, the official philosophies of the totalitarian regimes deny the inherent value of thought. For them thought is not a light but a weapon: its function, they say, is not to discover reality as it is, but to change and transform it with the purpose of leading us towards what is not. Such being the case, myth is better than science and rhetoric that works on the passions preferable to proof that appeals to the intellect.